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INTEGRATING LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO
PERSONAL AUTONOMY
INTRODUCTION
STEPHEN J. ANDERER*

ESPECT for the right of the individual to self-determination
permeates our legal history. Although there are those who,
because of the vagaries of constitutional interpretation would
question whether certain decisionmaking rights are "fundamental," it is not difficult to recognize the importance of these rights.
You need only imagine being sterilized against your will, being
forcibly administered mind-altering drugs, or having someone
other than yourself decide that you are not to be resuscitated if
you go into cardiac arrest. Undoubtedly, most of us would see
these actions as violations of our liberty or our dignity.
And yet, we are quite ready to tolerate such actions when the
person affected is a child or is elderly, mentally ill or mentally
retarded. Why? Because people in those groups "lack the capacity to exercise their decisionmaking rights" or because "it's for
their own good." But do they lack the capacity? And is it for
their own good? It was precisely these questions that the TwentyR
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Sixth Annual Villanova Law Review Symposium was designed to
address.
Because questions regarding decisionmaking capacity and regarding the impact that granting or denying decisionmaking
rights has on individuals are psychological in nature, the symposium drew upon the discipline of psychology. Because these
questions are to some degree empirical-that is, "capable of being.., verified or disproved by observation or experiment"'-the
symposium called upon psychological science. Although the ultimate debate is between the competing values of beneficence and
autonomy, it was hoped that psychological science could bring a
measure of objectivity to the debate. The objectivity of science
cannot replace our values, but it can help us determine the degree
to which those values are served.
The symposium participants were chosen for their demonstrated commitment to the less powerful members of our society.
They also were chosen for their wealth of knowledge of both law
and psychology, as well as their extensive practical experience.
On October 26, 1991, they came to Villanova Law School and
presented their thoughts on integrating legal and psychological
perspectives on the right to personal autonomy. The audience
was composed of law students, law professors, lawyers, judges,
psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, advocates and consumers of mental health services. The symposium participants
have expanded upon the ideas presented on that day in their contributions to this issue of the Villanova Law Review.
In his article, Professor Donald Bersoff examines recent
United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the rights of
the mentally disabled, children and other vulnerable groups to
make decisions that directly bear on their own interests. Professor Bersoff argues that the Court has erred in failing to fully
weigh autonomy in the balance between beneficence and autonomy. He further argues that the Court has erred in ignoring social science research that supports the capacity of these
vulnerable populations to make competent decisions. He contends that both legal and scientific analyses support the idea that
autonomy is to be preferred to state-imposed beneficence.
While Professor Bersoff argues that psychological science
supports the extension of autonomy rights to children in addition
to other vulnerable groups, Professor Elizabeth Scott challenges
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the theory and research supporting the argument for greater autonomy for children. Professor Scott and Professor Bersoff agree
that if the decisionmaking capacities of adults and minors are
more alike than is typically assumed by the legal system, then the
justification for the paternalistic stance of contemporary legal policy toward minors is weakened. Professor Scott, however, asserts
that advocates have overstated matters in claiming that research
demonstrates that adolescents are indistinguishable from adults
in their decisionmaking capacity. She also argues that advocates,
in using an informed consent model of decisionmaking, have not
considered a broad range of developmental differences between
adolescents and adults, most notably, differences in judgment.
According to Professor Scott, such developmental differences
may support differential treatment of adolescent and adult
decisionmaking.
Although Professors Scott and Bersoff disagree to a large extent, they do agree that scientific research can contribute to our
understanding of similarities and differences between adolescent
and adult decisionmaking. They assert that a better understanding of such similarities and differences may lead in turn to more
satisfying treatment of adolescent decisionmaking by our legal
system. Both Professor Scott and Professor Bersoff point to contradictions between the treatment of children in civil contexts and
the treatment of children in criminal contexts. They agree that
greater autonomy should be accompanied by greater accountability; if adolescents are given the power to make decisions for themselves, they must be held responsible for the consequences of
their decisions. Perhaps most significantly, as Professor Scott
points out, both she and Professor Bersoff are motivated at least
in part by "beneficent" concerns for adolescent welfare.
Like Professor Scott, contributors William Altman, Patricia
Parmelee and Michael Smyer are critical of traditional informed
consent doctrine. They focus specifically on issues surrounding
informed consent for medication, for "do not resuscitate" orders
and for care planning that arise for elderly persons living in institutional settings. They consider how psychological perspectives
on decisionmaking might improve application of the legal doctrine of informed consent. They assert that incorporating psychological perspectives may help the law distinguish between
those situations in which an elderly person's decisions should be
implemented and those in which paternalistic intervention is justified. Moreover, they contend that psychology can help identify
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intervention techniques that facilitate competent and voluntary
decisionmaking in the elderly.
According to Mr. Altman and Doctors Parmelee and Smyer,
the elements identified by informed consent doctrine must be
viewed as aspects of an ongoing, dynamic process wherein a person's capacity to exercise decisional autonomy depends on a variety of impinging environmental, psychological and social factors.
They posit a complex dialectical relationship between the need
for self-determination and the need for security through paternalistic intervention, suggesting that both needs must be met for the
healthy psychological adjustment of the impaired elderly. Furthermore, they suggest that individuals' "best interests" are inherently idiosyncratic and can be identified and served only
through careful examination of each individual and his or her
own circumstances.
Like Mr. Altman and Doctors Parmelee and Smyer, Professor
Bruce Winick suggests that allowing individuals to make voluntary choices in matters vitally affecting them may be essential to
psychological well-being. Professor Winick begins his article by
analyzing the treatment of autonomy values in constitutional and
legal doctrine, as well as in philosophical and political theory. He
examines in detail how several areas of constitutional doctrine reflect autonomy values. He then argues that principles of cognitive and social psychology suggest that self-determination
enhances the ability of individuals to set and achieve their goals
effectively, and that the alternative-government compulsion of
behavior thought to be beneficial-does not work as well. He illustrates the implications of the political and psychological value
of choice in a number of important mental health law contexts. In
particular, he examines the concepts of competence to make
treatment and hospitalization decisions and competence to stand
trial in the criminal process. Professor Winick's analysis suggests
a narrow definition of incompetence and a strong presumption in
favor of competence.
Perhaps with Professor Winick's strong presumption in favor
of competence in mind, ProfessorJames Ellis warns against deprivations of liberty that can occur in the name of granting autonomy and under the ruse of consent, when knowing, voluntary
assent was not truly given and may not even have been sought. In
his article, Professor Ellis attempts to draw a balance between
promoting decisionmaking in people with mental retardation and
society's interest in protection and habilitation. He discusses the

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss6/1

4

Anderer: Integrating Legal and Psychological Perspectives on the Right to

1992]

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

1567

nature of mental retardation and the social and political world in
which persons with mental retardation live. He examines the contexts in which legal issues about decisionmaking arise in the lives
of people with mental retardation, and the unique problems
presented by persons with mental retardation. With all of this in
mind, he analyzes legal doctrine relating to consent, with particular attention to the United States Supreme Court's 1990 decisions. Finally, he examines how this legal doctrine may apply in
the practical problem situations that people with mental retardation may confront in their lives.
Professor Ellis concludes that the interest of people with
mental retardation in autonomous decisionmaking in important
areas of their lives demands greater respect than the law and service delivery system now offer. Professor Bersoff clearly would
agree. Like Mr. Altman and Doctors Parmelee and Smyer, Professor Ellis acknowledges that competence varies with the complexity and importance of the subject matter of the proposed decision
and that it is possible to enhance the ability of individuals to make
their own decisions.
Ironically, readers of this issue of the Villanova Law Review
may find themselves both more enlightened and more confused,
because as the contributors to this issue penetrate the surface of
the debate between autonomy and beneficence, they reveal
greater complexity. Their articles demonstrate that the discipline
of psychology can tell us a great deal about decisionmaking and
its cognitive, emotional and relational aspects. Also, psychology
can inform us about the consequences of granting or denying the
power to make decisions in different contexts. It is clear, however, that more empirical research is needed regarding how people make decisions. In particular, as several contributors pointed
out, decisions are made in a social context, and there is a need for
more research into the social and relational aspects of decisionmaking. Furthermore, there is room for cross-fertilization between researchers focusing on children, on elderly persons and
on persons who are mentally retarded or mentally ill.
Even with the limitations of the present state of research, actors within the legal system can begin to acknowledge psychological factors in their determinations regarding decisionmaking
rights. These actors could attempt to match more accurately the
rights of the individual and the demands placed on the individual
with the needs and capacities of the individual. Such ideas should
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be found in courtrooms and judicial orders, not simply in classrooms and lawbooks.
Perhaps one of the most intriguing ideas raised by the contributors to the symposium is the idea of enhancing the capacity
of individuals to make their own decisions. Although "empowerment" has become a buzz word used by politicians of all stripes to
further their own agendas, these contributors suggest concrete
methods for empowering some of the most vulnerable individuals
in our society to make decisions for themselves. If we are sincere
about empowerment, we must attend to the intrapsychic, social,
developmental, educational, cultural, environmental and economic forces that prevent individuals from taking control over
their own lives. Although this symposium examined factors relevant to empowering children, elderly persons and persons with
mental illness or mental retardation, the same principle applies in
other contexts. For example, empowerment of the urban poor
requires an examination of those factors that impinge on their
ability to make decisions for themselves.
The current zeitgeist appears to favor responsibility and
community rights over autonomy and individual rights. However,
as the symposium contributors pointed out, autonomy is not necessarily incompatible with responsibility. If we give people the
power and the tools to make decisions for themselves, we then
have greater justification for holding them responsible for the
consequences of their decisions. Furthermore, the community
good may be served by allowing individuals the ability to make
decisions for themselves to the extent they are able, because making decisions for oneself may lead to a higher level of
psychosocial functioning and improved emotional well-being.
Ideally, the legal system can begin to develop approaches that
foster cooperative decisionmaking while still respecting individual
rights.
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